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Abstract
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer payment system proposed by Nakamoto in 2008. Based on the Nakamoto
consensus, Bagaria, Kannan, Tse, Fanti, and Viswanath proposed the Prism protocol in 2018 and showed
that it achieves near-optimal blockchain throughput while maintaining similar level of security as bitcoin.
This work provides the probabilistic guarantees for the liveliness and consistency of bitcoin and Prism
transactions. Previous analyses of the bitcoin and Prism have been either established under a simplified
discrete-time model or expressed in terms of exponential order result. This paper presents a streamlined
and strengthened analysis under a more realistic continuous-time model where the block propagation
delays are heterogeneous, arbitrary, and upper bounded by some constant. The goal is to show that every
valid transaction becomes permanent in all honest miners’ blockchains under a certain “typical event”,
which occurs with probability close to 1. To that end, we establish the blockchain growth theorem, the
blockchain quality theorem, and the common prefix theorem. In lieu of exponential order result in the
literature, the probabilistic guarantees for the desired properties of the bitcoin and Prism protocols take
the form of explicit expressions here, which provide improved design references for public transaction
ledger protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The bitcoin backbone protocol
Bitcoin was invented by Nakamoto [1] in 2008 as an electronic payment system. The system is built
on a distributed ledger technology commonly referred to as blockchain. A blockchain is a finite sequence
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
05
64
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 J
an
 20
20
2of transaction-recording blocks which begins with a genesis block, and every subsequent block contains
a cryptographic hashing of the previous one (which confirms all preceding blocks). To mine a block
requires proof of work: A nonce must be included such that the block’s hash value satisfies a difficulty
requirement. Miners join a peer-to-peer network to inform each other of new blocks. An honest miner
follows the longest-chain rule, i.e., it always tries to mine a block at the maximum height.
Different blocks may be mined and announced at around the same time. So honest miners may extend
different blockchains depending on which blocks they hear first. This phenomenon is called forking,
which must be resolved quickly to reach timely consensus about the ledger.
An adversarial miner may wish to sabotage consensus or manipulate the network to a consensus
to its own advantage. In particular, forking presents opportunities for double spending, which is only
possible if a transaction included in the longest fork at one time is not included in a different fork that
overtakes the first one to become the longest blockchain. Nakamoto [1] characterized the race between
the honest miners and the adversary as a random walk with a drift. Nakamoto showed that the probability
the adversary blockchain overtakes the honest miner’s consensus blockchain vanishes exponentially over
time as long as the collective mining power of adversarial miners is less than that of honest miners. In
this case, a bitcoin transaction becomes (arbitrarily) secure if it is confirmed by enough new blocks.
Garay, Kiayias, and Leonardos [2] first formally described and analyzed the bitcoin backbone protocol
under the lockstep synchronous model, where all miners have perfectly synchronized rounds and all
miners receive the same block(s) at exactly the end of the round. Under this model, [2] established a
blockchain quality theorem, which states the honest miners contribute at least a certain percentage of
the blocks with wish probability. Also established in [2] is a common prefix theorem, which states if
a block is k blocks deep in an honest miner’s blockchain, then the block is in all other honest miners’
blockchains with high probability (the probability that some honest miner does not extend this block
vanishes exponentially with k). Kiayias and Panagiotakos [3] established a blockchain growth theorem,
which quantifies the number of blocks added to the blockchain during any time interval. The blockchain
growth theorem and the blockchain quality theorem guarantee that many honest blocks will eventually
become k deep in an honest miner’s blockchain (liveliness). The common prefix theorem then guarantees
that an honest miner’s k-deep block become permanent consensus of all honest miners (consistency).
Thus, every transaction that is recorded in a sufficiently deep block in an honest miner’s blockchain is
with high probability guaranteed to remain in the final ledger.
The strictly lockstep synchrony model completely assumes away network delay and failure. Several
meaningful analyses have been proposed under the non-lockstep synchrony model, where messages can
be delayed arbitrarily but the delay is upper bounded. A complicated analysis with strong assumptions
3[4] showed that the blockchain growth theorem, the blockchain quality theorem, and the common
prefix theorem remain valid under the non-lockstep synchrony model. Reference [5] also reasoned the
consistency of bitcoin protocol using the Markov chains, although their result has a non-closed form.
Most previous analyses [2], [4], [6], [7] assume the blockchain’s lifespan is finite, i.e., there exists a
maximum round when the blockchain ends. In [8], we dropped the finite horizon assumption and proved
stronger properties of the bitcoin backbone protocol regardless of whether or not the blockchains have a
finite lifespan.
Most previous work [2], [4], [6], [7], [9] expressed the probability of the mentioned properties in
exponential order result (big O notation). Our previous work [8] gives the explicit bounds for the liveliness
and consistency under the non-lockstep synchronous discrete-time model. The strategies taken by previous
works can be described as the following: Intuitively, during any time interval the liveliness and consistency
of honest blockchains hold under the following conditions: 1) The number of honest blocks mined during
this time interval is larger than the number of adversarial blocks mined, so that the longest blockchain will
not be overtaken by the adversarial party. 2) There are enough number of non-reversible honest blocks
to guard the honest blockchain, in case the adversarial use strategies (like selfish mining) to introduce
disagreement between honest miners and split their hashing power. Technically, with respect to time
interval [s, t], a “good event” occurs if the numbers of various blocks mined during the period are close
to their respective expected values. A “typical event” with respect to [s, t] occurs if good events occur for
all time intervals covering [s, t], so that the consistency of honest blockchains is guaranteed from time t
onward. The desired properties hold under the typical events, which are shown to almost certainly occur
in the discrete-time model.
The discrete-time model eases analysis but is still a significant departure from reality. In 2019, Ren [9]
extended the liveliness and consistency of bitcoin protocol assuming the continuous-time model where
mining is modelled as a Poisson point process. The probability bounds are shown to be exponential in
a linear order term in the confirmation time.
In this paper, we provide explicit probabilistic guarantees for the liveliness and consistency properties
of the bitcoin transactions under the continuous-time model. To this end, we develop a technique to
show that the typical event, which is the intersection of uncountably many good events with arbitrary
real valued starting and ending points, still occurs with high probability. This treatment enables us to
derive explicit probability bounds for the liveliness and consistency of bitcoin blockchains, which are
more refined than previous exponential order result.
4B. The Prism protocol
The throughput of bitcoin is very limited by design to ensure security [10]. In particular, the average
time interval between new blocks is set to be much longer than the block propagation delays so that forking
is infrequent [11]. Many ideas have been proposed to improve the blockchain throughput. One way is to
construct high-forking blockchains by optimizing the forking rule, which is vulnerable to certain attacks
[11]–[17]. Another line of work is to decouple the various functionalities of the blockchain [18], [19],
under the spirit of which Bagaria, Kannan, Tse, Fanti, and Viswanath [7] proposed the Prism protocol in
2018. The Prism protocol defines one proposer blockchain and many voter blockchains. The voter blocks
elect a leader block at each level of the proposer blockchain by voting. The sequence of leader blocks
concludes the contents of all voter blocks, and finalizes the ledger. A voter blockchain follows the bitcoin
protocol to provide security to leader election process. With this design, the throughput (containing the
content of all voter blocks) is decoupled from the mining rate of each voter blockchain. Slow mining
rate guarantees the security of each voter blockchain as well as the leader sequence they selected. Prism
achieves security against up to 50% adversarial hashing power, optimal throughput up to the capacity of
the network, and fast confirmation latency for honest transactions. A thorough description and analysis
is found in [7].
In [7], liveliness and consistency of Prism transactions were proved assuming a finite life span of the
blockchains under the lockstep synchrony model [7]. In [8] we have strengthened and extended the results
to the non-lockstep synchrony model. This paper establishes the key properties for the continuous-time
model. Compared with bitcoin blockchains whose consistency is achieved by the numerical advantage of
honest blocks, the Prism blockchains achieve consistency by the permanent voting from voter blockchains.
II. THE BITCOIN BACKBONE PROTOCOL
Let ∆ denote an upper bound for all communication delays. Let α denote the collective mining
power of honest miners. Let β denote the collective mining power of all other miners, referred to as
adversarial miners from now on. The mining process of each honest miner is modelled as an independent
homogeneous continuous-time Poisson point process. If a block is mined by some honest miner, we call
it an honest block; otherwise the block is called an adversarial block. If a blockchain is adopted by an
honest miner at time t, we call it an honest blockchain (at time t).
Let Ht denote the total number of honest blocks mined up until time t. For convenience, it is assumed
a genesis block is placed at t = 0 with height equal to 0. The genesis block is regarded as honest.
Evidently, (Ht, t ≥ 0) is a homogeneous Poisson point process with rate α.
5Definition 1. An honest block mined at time t is called a lagger if it is mined strictly more than ∆
seconds after the last honest block was mined, i.e., if Ht = 1 +Ht−∆. The lagger is also called a loner
if the next block mined is also a lagger, i.e., if Ht+∆ = Ht.
By assumption, regardless of what strategy the adversarial miners take, there exists an independent
homogeneous Poisson point process (Zt, t ≥ 0) with rate β that dominates the mining of adversarial
blocks, in the sense that Z[s, t] = Zt−Zs is always no less than the number of adversarial blocks mined
during interval (s, t]. Let N [s, t] = Ht−Hs denote the total number of honest blocks mined during time
interval (s, t]. Let X[s, t] denote the number of all laggers mined during time interval (s, t]. Let Y [s, t]
denote the number of all loners mined during time interval (s, t].
Definition 2. For all 0 ≤ s < t and 0 < δ < 1, the δ-good event covering time interval (s, t] is
Eδ[s, t] = Eδ1 [s, t] ∩ Eδ2 [s, t] ∩ Eδ3 [s, t] ∩ Eδ4 [s, t] (1)
where
Eδ1 [s, t] = {(1− δ)E[N [s, t]] < N [s, t] < (1 + δ)E[N [s, t]]} (2)
Eδ2 [s, t] = {(1− δ)E[X[s, t]] < X[s, t]} (3)
Eδ3 [s, t] = {(1− δ)E[Y [s, t]] < Y [s, t]} (4)
Eδ4 [s, t] = {Z[s, t] < E[Z[s, t]] + δE[Y [s, t]]} . (5)
Under event Eδ1 [s, t], the number honest blocks mined during time interval (s, t] does not deviate from
its expected value by more than a fraction of δ. Under event Eδ2 [s, t], the number of laggers X[s, t] is no
less than 1 − δ of its expected value. Under event Eδ3 [s, t], the number of loners Y [s, t] is no less than
1− δ of its expected value. Under event Eδ4 [s, t], the upper bound for the number of adversarial blocks
is no more than its expected value plus δ of the expectation of Y [s, t]. Under Eδ[s, t], we have 1) a
“typical” number of honest blocks, 2) “enough” laggers and loners, and 3) the total number of adversarial
blocks is unextraordinary.
During time interval (s, t], for i = 0, 1, . . . , N [s, t], denote Xi = 1 if the i-th honest block starting
from time s is a lagger, and 0 otherwise. Then we have X[s, t] =
∑N [s,t]
i=1 Xi. Likewise, denote Yi = 1
if the i-th honest block is a loner and 0 otherwise. Then we have Y [s, t] =
∑N [s,t]
i=1 Yi.
Lemma 3. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t and non-negative integer k, conditioned on N [s, t] = k,
X1, X2, . . . , Xk are independent Bernoulli random variables with
P (Xi = 1|N [s, t] = k) = e−α∆, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. (6)
6Proof. Since the inter-arrival times of the Poisson process (Ht, t > 0) are independent exponential random
variables with the same parameter α (Page 419 in [20]), (6) follows.
For convenience, let
g = e−α∆. (7)
Lemma 4. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t and non-negative integer k, conditioned on N [s, t] = k,
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk are Bernoulli random variables with
P (Yi = 1|N [s, t] = k) = g2, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. (8)
Proof. Let Xk+1 = 1 if the first honest block after time t is a lagger and Xk+1 = 0 otherwise. Then for
i = 0, 1, . . . , k, we have Yi = XiXi+1. Note that Xis are independent of each other, we have
P (Yi = 1|N [s, t] = k)
= P (Xi = 1|N [s, t] = k)P (Xi+1 = 1|N [s, t] = k) (9)
= g2, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. (10)
Lemma 5. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t,
E[N [s, t]] = α(t− s). (11)
Proof. The result follows from the fact that N [s, t] is a Poisson distribution with parameter α(t−s).
Lemma 6. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t,
E[X[s, t]] = gα(t− s). (12)
Proof.
E[X[s, t]] = E[
N [s,t]∑
i=1
Xi] (13)
= E[E[
N [s,t]∑
i=1
Xi|N [s, t]]] (14)
= E[gN [s, t]] (15)
= gα(t− s). (16)
7Lemma 7. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t,
E[Y [s, t]] = g2α(t− s). (17)
Proof.
E[Y [s, t]] = E[
N [s,t]∑
i=1
Xi] (18)
= E[E[
N [s,t]∑
i=1
Yi|N [s, t]]] (19)
= E[g2N [s, t]] (20)
= g2α(t− s). (21)
Lemma 8. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t,
E[Z[s, t]] = β(t− s). (22)
Proof. The result follows from the fact that Z[s, t] is a Poisson distribution with parameter β(t− s).
Properties in the following parts of this paper require the parameters satisfy
(1− 3δ)g2α > β. (23)
This assumption indicates the mining rate of adversarial blocks must be strictly less than the mining
rate of loners multiplied by the square of “propagation discount” to enable a feasible δ. In practice,
the difficulty of this requirement depends on the upper bound of propagation delay ∆. For example, if
∆ = 0.5 second, an honest mining power of 70% enables δ = 0.13.
Next, we introduce a few preliminaries.
Lemma 9. Let X be a Poisson random variable with parameter λ. Then for every δ ∈ (0, 1],
P (X < (1− δ)λ) < e− δ
2λ
2 , (24)
and
P (X > (1 + δ)λ) < e−
δ2λ
3 . (25)
8Proof. To prove (24), we have
P (X < (1− δ)λ) = P (e−tX > e−t(1−δ)λ) (26)
<
E[e−tX ]
e−t(1−δ)λ
(27)
= e(e
−t−1)λ+t(1−δ)λ (28)
where (27) is due to Markov inequality and (28) is due to the moment generating function of Poisson
random variable. Picking t = − log(1− δ), we have
P (X < (1− δ)λ) < e−δ−(1−δ) log(1−δ) (29)
< e−
δ2
2
λ (30)
where (30) is due to (1− δ) log(1− δ) > −δ + δ22 for δ ∈ (0, 1).
To prove (25), we have
P (X > (1 + δ)λ) = P (etX > et(1+δ)λ) (31)
<
E[etX ]
et(1+δ)λ
(32)
= e(e
t−1)λ−t(1+δ)λ (33)
where (31) is due to Markov inequality and (32) is due to the moment generating function of Poisson
random variable. Picking t = log(1 + δ), we have
P (X > (1 + δ)λ) < eδ−(1+δ) log(1+δ) (34)
< e−
δ2
3
λ (35)
where (35) is due to (1 + δ) log(1 + δ) > δ + δ
2
3 for δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 10. (Chernoff bound, page 69 in [21]) Let X ∼ binomial(n, p). Then for every δ ∈ (0, 1],
P (X < (1− δ)pn) < e− δ
2pn
2 , (36)
and
P (X < (1 + δ)pn) < e−
δ2pn
3 . (37)
Lemma 11. If N is a Poisson random variable, then for any h ∈ [0, 1),
E[e−hN ] ≤ e− 12hE[N ]. (38)
9Proof. Let λ = E[N ]. Then,
E[e−hN ] =
∞∑
k=0
e−hkP (N = k) (39)
=
∞∑
k=0
e−hk
λk
k!
e−λ (40)
=
∞∑
k=0
(e−hλ)k
k!
e−λ (41)
= ee
−hλe−λ (42)
≤ e−h2 λ (43)
where (42) is due to Taylor expansion and (43) is due to e−h ≤ 1− h2 for all h ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 12. For all 0 < δ < 1 and 0 ≤ s < t, we have
P
(
Eδ[s, t]
)
> 1− 7e− 18g2α(t−s). (44)
Proof. We analyze events Eδ1 [s, t], E
δ
2 [s, t], E
δ
3 [s, t], and E
δ
4 [s, t] separately.
First, we have
P ((E1[s, t])
c) = P
(
N δ[s, t] > E[N [s, t]] + δE[N [s, t]]
)
+ P (N [s, t] < E[N [s, t]]− δE[N [s, t]]) (45)
< 2e−
δ2α(t−s)
3 , (46)
where (46) is due to Lemma 9.
We have
P ((Eδ2 [s, t])
c) = P (X[s, t] < (1− δ)E[X[s, t]]) (47)
=
∞∑
k=0
P (X[s, t] < (1− δ)E[X[s, t]]|N [s, t] = k)P (N [s, t] = k) (48)
=
∞∑
k=0
P
(
k∑
i=1
Xi < (1− δ)E
[
k∑
i=1
Xi
])
P (N [s, t] = k) (49)
<
∞∑
k=0
e−
δ2gk
2 · P (N [s, t] = k) (50)
= E
[
e−
δ2g
2
N [s,t]
]
(51)
≤ e− δ
2g
4
α(t−s) (52)
where (50) is due to Lemma 3 and Proposition 10. (52) is due to Lemma 11.
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Note that although Yi and Yi+1 are dependent, Yi and Yi+2 are independent. For all random variables
U and V and constants a and b, the following holds:
P (U + V ≤ a+ b) ≤ P (U ≤ a or V ≤ b) (53)
≤ P (U ≤ a) + P (V ≤ b). (54)
We calculate even blocks and odd blocks separately:
P ((Eδ3 [s, t])
c) = P (Y [s, t] ≤ (1− δ)E[Y [s, t]]) (55)
< P
bN[s,t]2 c∑
k=0
Y2k+1 < (1− δ)E
bN[s,t]2 c∑
k=0
Y2k+1
+
P
bN[s,t]2 c∑
k=1
Y2k < (1− δ)E
bN[s,t]2 c∑
k=1
Y2k
 (56)
≤ E
[
e−
δ2
2
g2(bN[s,t]2 c+1)
]
+ E
[
e−
δ2
2
g2(bN[s,t]2 c)
]
(57)
≤ 2E
[
e−
δ2
2
g2(N[s,t]−12 )
]
(58)
≤ 2e δ
2g
4 e−
δ2
8
g2α(t−s) (59)
< 3e−
δ2
8
g2α(t−s) (60)
where (56) is due to Lemma 4 and Proposition 10. (59) is due to Lemma 11.
Note that the moment generating function for a Poisson random variable with parameter λ is eλ(e
u−1).
We have
P (Ec4[s, t]) = P (Z[s, t] ≥ E[Z[s, t]] + δE[Y [s, t]]) (61)
< E[eu(Z[s,t]−E[Z[s,t]]−δE[Y [s,t]])] (62)
=
E
[
eZ[s,t]u
]
eE[Z[s,t]]u+δE[Y [s,t]]u
(63)
=
eβ(t−s)(eu−1)
eβ(t−s)u+δg2α(t−s)u
(64)
≤ e
β(t−s)(eu−1)
eβ(t−s)u+
1
2
β(t−s)u+ 1
2
δg2α(t−s)u (65)
= e(e
u−1−u(1+ δ
2
))β(t−s)− δ2 g2α(t−s)u, (66)
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where (65) is due to g2α ≥ β. Picking u = log(1 + δ2), we have
P (Ec4[s, t]) < e
(eu−1−u(1+ δ2 ))β(t−s)− δ2 g2α(t−s)u, (67)
< e−
δ
2
log(1+ δ
2
)g2α(t−s) (68)
< e−
δ2g2
6
α(t−s) (69)
where (68) is due to δ2 − (1 + δ2) log(1 + δ2) < 0 for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and (69) is due to log(1 + δ2) > δ3 for
all δ ∈ (0, 1).
By (46), (52), (60), and (69), we have
P
(
Eδ[s, t]
)
= 1− P
(
(Eδ[s, t])c
)
(70)
≥ 1− P
(
(Eδ1 [s, t])
c
)
− P
(
(Eδ2 [s, t])
c
)
− P
(
(Eδ3 [s, t])
c
)
− P
(
(Eδ4 [s, t])
c
)
(71)
> 1− 7e− 18 δ2g2α(t−s) (72)
where (72) is due to g < 1.
Note that Lemma 12 reflects the law of large numbers by stating the probability of
(
Eδ[s, t]
)c vanishes
exponentially with t− s.
Definition 13. (Typical event) The δ-typical event on interval (s, t] is defined as:
Gδ[s, t] = ∩a,b∈R,0≤a≤s,0≤bEδ[s− a, t+ b]. (73)
Definition 14. For 0 ≤ s < t, define
Jδ[s, t] =
(
∩k,`∈Z,0≤k≤dse,0≤`E
δ
3 [dse − k, btc+ `]
)
. (74)
Lemma 15. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t− 4δ ,
Jδ[s, t] ⊂ Gδ[s, t]. (75)
Proof. We note that the event Gδ[s, t] occurs when the events Eδ[s− a, t+ b] simultaneously occurs for
all real number 0 ≤ a ≤ s and b ≥ 0. The G event is defined as the intersection of uncountably many E
events, whereas the J event is defined as the intersection of countably many. Bounding the probability
of the G event by the J event eases the calculation. For every 0 ≤ a ≤ s and b ≥ 0, we show that
Eδ[s− a, t+ b] occurs if Jδ[s, t] occurs:
Note that Jδ[s, t] indicates E
δ
3 [dse − k, btc + `] for all integers 0 ≤ k ≤ dse and 0 ≤ `. For every
0 ≤ a ≤ s and b ≥ 0, let k = dse − ds− ae and ` = bt+ bc − btc, we know
E
δ
3 [dse − k, btc+ `] = E δ3 [ds− ae, bt+ bc] (76)
12
occurs. Similarly, let k = dse − bs− ac and ` = dt+ be − btc, we know
E
δ
3 [dse − k, btc+ `] = E δ3 [bs− ac, dt+ be] (77)
occurs.
To prove Eδ1 [s− a, t+ b] occurs, we have
N [s− a, t+ b] ≥ N [ds− ae, bt+ bc] (78)
> (1− δ
3
)E[N [ds− ae, bt+ bc]] (79)
= (1− δ
3
)α(bt+ bc − ds− ae]) (80)
≥ (1− δ
3
)α(t− s+ a+ b− 2) (81)
= (1− δ
3
)α(t− s+ a+ b)(1− 2
t− s+ a+ b) (82)
> (1− δ
3
)(1− δ
2
)α(t− s+ a+ b) (83)
> (1− δ)E[N [s− a, t+ b]] (84)
where (79) is due to (2), (80) is due to Lemma 5, and (82) is due to t− s > 4δ . Also,
N [s− a, t+ b] < N [bs− ac, dt+ be] (85)
< (1 +
δ
3
)E[N [bs− ac, dt+ be]] (86)
= (1 +
δ
3
)α(dt+ be − bs− ac) (87)
≤ (1 + δ
3
)α(t− s+ a+ b+ 2) (88)
= (1 +
δ
3
)α(t− s+ a+ b)(1 + 2
t− s+ a+ b) (89)
< (1 +
δ
3
)(1 +
δ
2
)α(t− s+ a+ b) (90)
< (1 + δ)E[N [s− a, t+ b]] (91)
where (86) is due to (2), (87) is due to Lemma 5, and (89) is due to t− s > 4δ .
To prove Eδ2 [s− a, t+ b] occurs, we have
X[s− a, t+ b] > X[ds− ae, bt+ bc] (92)
> (1− δ
3
)E[X[ds− ae, bt+ bc]] (93)
= (1− δ
3
)gα(bt+ bc − ds− ae) (94)
> (1− δ
3
)gα(t− s+ a+ b− 2) (95)
13
= (1− δ
3
)gα(t− s+ a+ b)(1− 2
t− s+ a+ b) (96)
> (1− δ
3
)(1− δ
2
)gα(t− s+ a+ b) (97)
> (1− δ)E[X[s− a, t+ b]] (98)
where (93) is due to (3), (94) is due to Lemma 6, and (96) is due to t− s > 4δ .
To prove Eδ3 [s− a, t+ b] occurs, we have
Y [s− a, t+ b] > Y [ds− ae, bt+ bc] (99)
> (1− δ
3
)E[Y [ds− ae, bt+ bc]] (100)
= (1− δ
3
)g2α(bt+ bc]− Y [ds− ae) (101)
> (1− δ
3
)g2α(t− s+ a+ b− 2) (102)
= (1− δ
3
)g2α(t− s+ a+ b)(1− 2
t− s+ a+ b) (103)
> (1− δ
3
)(1− δ
2
)g2α(t− s+ a+ b) (104)
> (1− δ)E[Y [s− a, t+ b]] (105)
where (100) is due to (4), (101) is due to Lemma 7, and (103) is due to t− s > 4δ .
At last, to prove Eδ4 [s− a, t+ b] occurs, we have
Z[s− a, t+ b] < Z[bs− ac, dt+ be] (106)
< E[Z[bs− ac, dt+ be] + δ
3
E[Y [bs− ac, dt+ be]] (107)
= β(dt+ be − bs− ac) + δ
3
g2α(dt+ be − bs− ac) (108)
< β(t− s+ a+ b+ 2) + δ
3
g2α(t− s+ a+ b+ 2) (109)
= β(t− s+ a+ b)(1 + 2
t− s+ a+ b) +
δ
3
g2α(t− s+ a+ b)(1 + 2
t− s+ a+ b)
(110)
< (1 +
δ
2
)β(t− s+ a+ b) + (1 + δ
2
)
δ
3
g2α(t− s+ a+ b) (111)
< β(t− s+ a+ b) + δ
g
2
α(t− s+ a+ b) (112)
= E[Z[s− a, t+ b]] + δE[Y [s− a, t+ b]]. (113)
where (107) is due to (5) and (112) is due to (23).
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To sum up, under Jδ[s, t], all real number 0 ≤ a ≤ s and b ≥ 0, all Eδ1 [s− a, t+ b], Eδ2 [s− a, t+ b],
Eδ3 [s− a, t+ b], and Eδ4 [s− a, t+ b] occur. Thus Eδ[s− a, t+ b] occurs for all valid a and b. Thus the
occurrence of Gδ[s, t].
For convenience, let
η =
1
72
δ2g2α. (114)
Lemma 16. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t− 4δ ,
P (Gδ[s, t]) > 1− 9η−2e−η(t−s). (115)
Proof.
P (Gδc[s, t]) < P (Jδc[s, t]) (116)
= P
(
∩k,`∈Z,0≤k≤dse,0≤`E
δ
3 [dse − k, btc+ `]
)
(117)
<
∑
k,`∈Z,0≤k≤dse,0≤`
7e−
1
8(
δ
3)
2
g2α(btc−dse+k+`) (118)
<
∑
k,`∈Z,0≤k,0≤`
7e−
δ2
72
g2α(t−s+k+`−2) (119)
<
∞∑
m=0
7(m+ 1)e−
δ2
72
g2α(t−s+m−2) (120)
=
7e
1
36
δ2g2α(
1− e− δ272 g2α
)2 e− δ272 g2α(t−s) (121)
< 9η−2e−η(t−s) (122)
where (122) is due to 1− e−x >
√
8
9x for x ∈ (0, 172) and e
1
36 < 87 .
Lemma 17. (Lemma 4 in [9]) Laggers have different heights.
Proof. Suppose two laggers, B and B′, have the same height k. Let t and t′ denote the time B and B′
are mined, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume t < t′. Then we have t′ > t + ∆ by the
assumption that B′ is a lagger. On the other hand, all honest miners will extend a blockchain equal or
longer than k after time t+ ∆. So the height of B′ cannot be k, contradicting the assumption.
Lemma 18. (Lemma 4 in [9]) Suppose some honest blockchain’s kth block B is a loner, then the kth
block of every blockchain is either B or an adversarial block.
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Proof. Suppose block B is a loner of height k in an honest blockchain, and the kth block of another
blockchain is B′ 6= B. Assume B and B′ are mined at time t and t′, respectively. Since B is a loner
we must have t′ < t−∆ or t′ > t+ ∆. If t′ < t−∆, all honest blocks mined after t′ + ∆ will extend
a blockchain equal or longer than k. If t′ > t + ∆, all honest blocks mined after t + ∆ will extend
a blockchain equal or longer than k. Both contradict the assumption that B and B′ are both of height
k.
Lemma 19. For all real numbers δ, s, t, and integer k satisfying 0 ≤ s < t, 0 < δ < 1, and k ≥
(2− δ)α(t− s), under event Gδ[s, t], every honest miner’s k-deep block at time t must be mined no later
than s.
Proof. The blockchain growth of an honest miner during time interval (s, t] is upper bounded by N [s, t]+
Z[s, t]. Note that under Gδ[s, t],
N [s, t] + Z[s, t] < (1 + δ)α(t− s) + β(t− s) + δg2α(t− s) (123)
< (1 + δ)α(t− s) + (1− 2δ)g2α(t− s) (124)
< (1 + δ)α(t− s) + (1− 2δ)α(t− s) (125)
< (2− δ)α(t− s) (126)
where (123) is due to (2) and (4), and (124) is due to (23). Thus, the k-deep block must be mined no
later than s.
Theorem 20. (Blockchain growth theorem) Let 0 ≤ r < s < t − 2∆δ . Then under δ-typical event
Gδ[s+ ∆, t−∆], the height of every honest blockchain increases by at least (1− δ)2gα(t− r) during
(r, t].
Proof. Assume an honest miner adopts a blockchain of height ` at time r. Then at time r + ∆, all
honest miners have adopted a blockchain of height at least `. Moreover, Gδ[s + ∆, t − ∆] indicates
Eδ[s+ ∆, t−∆] occurs. Then, during time interval (r + ∆, t−∆], the number of laggers is at least
(1− δ)gα(t− r − 2∆)
= (1− δ)gαt− r − 2∆
t− r (t− r) (127)
> (1− δ)2gα(t− r) (128)
where (128) is due to 2∆t−r < δ. According to Lemma 17, these laggers have different heights, and they
arrive at all honest miners by time t. Thus, the honest miner must adopt a blockchain whose height is at
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least `+ (1− δ)2gα(t− r) at time t.
Theorem 21. (Blockchain quality theorem) For integer k ≥ 2(2−δ)α(∆+2)δ , in any k consecutive blocks,
the fraction of honest blocks is at least 1− (1− δ2)g with probability at least 1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α .
Proof. The intuition is that under typical event, an honest miner’s blockchain grow by at least X[s +
∆, t−∆] according to Lemma 17. Meanwhile, the number of adversarial blocks mined is upper bounded
by (5). Thus, at least certain fraction of blocks must be honest even in the worst case that all adversarial
blocks are included in the blockchain.
To be precise, assume the head and tail of these k blocks are at height h0 and h1, respectively. Let
block h′0 be the highest honest block on the same blockchain which is mined before block h0. h′0 can
be as high as h0− 1 and as small as 0. Assume block h′0 is mined at time t0. If this block is the genesis
block, then t0 = 0. If there is any honest block mined after h1 on the same blockchain, we denote the
lowest as h′1 and denote the time it is mined as t1; otherwise let t1 be the current time and let be h′1 be
current height plus 1.
By definition, the blocks at heights {h′0 + 1, . . . , h0 − 1} and {h1 + 1, . . . , h′1 − 1} are adversarial.
Assume event Gδ[t0 + ∆, t1 −∆] occurs. Therefore,
t1 − t0 > k
(2− δ)α (129)
>
2∆
δ
+
4
δ
. (130)
where (129) is by Lemma 19 and (130) is by k ≥ 2(2−δ)α(∆+2)δ .
Denote the number of adversarial blocks between block h0 (inclusive) and block h1 (inclusive) as z.
We have
z
k
≤ z + (h0 − h
′
0 − 1) + (h′1 − h1 − 1)
k + (h0 − h′0 − 1) + (h′1 − h1 − 1)
(131)
≤ Z[t0, t1]
k + (h0 − h′0 − 1) + (h′1 − h1 − 1)
(132)
≤ Z[t0, t1]
(1− δ)2gα(t1 − t0) (133)
<
β(t1 − t0) + δg2α(t1 − t0)
(1− δ)2gα(t1 − t0) (134)
=
1
(1− δ)2
(
β
gα
+ δg
)
(135)
<
1
(1− δ)2 ((1− 3δ)g + δg) (136)
< (1− δ2)g, (137)
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where (131) is due to z ≤ k. Since all blocks within height {h′0 + 1, . . . , h0} and {h1, . . . , h′1 − 1}
are adversarial, z + (h0 − h′0 − 1) + (h′1 − h1 − 1) is the number of adversarial blocks between block
h′0 + 1 and block h′1− 1. These adversarial blocks are after block h′0 so they must be mined within time
(t0, t1], thus we have (132). On the other hand, during (t0, t1] the blockchain’s length increases by at
least k + (h0 − h′0 − 1) + (h′1 − h1 − 1). This number is no less than (1− δ)2gα(t1 − t0) by Theorem
20. Thus we have (133). (134) is due to (5), (136) is due to (23), and (137) is due to δ ∈ (0, 1).
Note that according to (130), we know t1 − t0 − 2∆ > 4δ . According to Lemma 16,
P (Gδ[t0 + ∆, t1 −∆]) > 1− 9η−2e−η(t1−t0−2∆) (138)
≥ 1− 9η−2e−η(1−δ)(t1−t0) (139)
> 1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α (140)
To sum up, with probability at least 1 − 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α , event Gδ[t0 + ∆, t1 −∆] occurs, under which
the fraction of honest blocks is ensured.
Definition 22. Let t > 0. A block or a sequence (of blocks) is said to be permanent after t if the block
or sequence remains in all honest blockchains starting from t.
Definition 23. Let t > 0. A block or a sequence (of blocks) is said to be -permanent after t if with
probability at least 1− , the block or sequence is permanent after time t.
Theorem 24. (Common prefix theorem) Suppose real numbers s, t, δ and integer k satisfy 0 ≤ s < t− 2∆δ ,
0 < δ < 1, and k ≥ (2− δ)α(t− s). Suppose an honest blockchain has a k-deep prefix at time t, then
under Gδ[s+ ∆, t−∆], the prefix is permanent after t.
Proof. The intuition is based on Lemma 18: If a block is a loner, a different block on any other blockchain
at the same position must be adversarial. If some adversarial miners wish to fork the blockchain, they
must generate at least one adversarial block for every loner after the common prefix. This can not be true
under certain typical event because the number of loner is lower bounded and the number of adversarial
blocks are upper bounded.
To be precise, we prove the desired result by contradiction. Let B∗ be the last block of this blockchain’s
k-deep prefix. Let C1 be the first honest blockchain that does not extend B∗. Assume C1 is adopted
by some honest miner right after t1. Then at time t1, an honest miner adopts a blockchain that extends
B∗, denote this blockchain as C ′1. Assume blockchain C1 and blockchain C ′1 end with block B1 and B′1
18
𝐵𝐵0
′
𝐵𝐵0
Last common honest block of 𝐶𝐶1 and 𝐶𝐶1′
Last common ancestor of 𝐶𝐶1 and 𝐶𝐶1′
𝐵𝐵∗
Blockchain 𝐶𝐶1
Blockchain 𝐶𝐶1′
... 
... 
Time 𝑡𝑡1
... 
... 
Time 𝑡𝑡0
𝐵𝐵1
𝐵𝐵1
′
𝑘𝑘 blocks
Fig. 1. Illustration to prove common prefix theorem.
respectively. Assume B0 is the last common ancestor of C1 and C ′1. Assume B′0 is the last honest block
on the common prefix of C1 and C ′1 (B′0 can be the same as B0). Let t0 be the time B′0 is mined.
According to Lemma 19, since B∗0 is at least k blocks deep and k ≥ (2− δ)α(t− s), we know t0 < s.
Thus, Gδ[s+ ∆, t−∆] indicates Gδ[t0 + ∆, t1 −∆] occurs. We have
Y [t0 + ∆, t1 −∆] > (1− δ)g2α(t1 − t0 − 2∆) (141)
= (1− δ) t1 − t0 − 2∆
t1 − t0 g
2α(t1 − t0) (142)
> (1− δ)2g2α(t1 − t0) (143)
> (1− 3δ)g2α(t1 − t0) + δg2α(t1 − t0) (144)
> β(t1 − t0) + δg2α(t1 − t0) (145)
> Z[t0, t1] (146)
where (141) is due to (4), (143) is due to t1 − t0 > t− s > 2∆δ , (144) is due to (23), and (146) is due
to (5).
On the other hand, we will show Z[t0, t1] > Y [t0 + ∆, t1 − ∆] under the above scenario. Assume
the heights of B0, B′0, B1, and B′1 are h0, h′0, h1, and h′1 respectively. Since some honest miner adopts
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blockchain C1 over C ′1 at time t1, we know h1 ≥ h′1.
Consider a loner B which is mined within time interval (t0 + ∆, t1 − ∆]. Assume B’s height is h.
Since B′0 is mined at time t0, every honest miner has received a blockchain of height at least h′0 by time
t0 + ∆, thus h > h′0. What is more, if h > h′1 and B is mined by time t1 − ∆, blockchain C ′1 (with
height h′1) will not be the highest blockchain at time t1, and no honest miner will adopt it. Thus, h ≤ h′1.
We have h ∈ (h′0, h′1].
If h′0 < h ≤ h0, according to our definition, the blocks at height h of blockchain C1 and blockchain
C ′1 are adversarial. If h0 < h ≤ h′1, there are at least two different blocks at position h since there are
at least two diverging blockchains. According to Lemma 18, at least one of the position h blocks are
adversarial. That is to say, for any loner B mined within (t0 + ∆, t1 − ∆], we can find at least one
adversarial block. The adversarial blocks whose height is within (h′0, h′1] must be mined within (t0, t1],
thus, we have Y [t0 + ∆, t1 −∆] ≤ Z[t0, t1]. Contradiction arises, hence the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 25. For integer k ≥ 2(2−δ)α(∆+2)δ , suppose an honest blockchain has a k-deep prefix at time
t, then its k-prefix is permanent after t with probability at least 1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α .
Proof. Denote s = t− k(2−δ)α . Then,
s− t = k
(2− δ)α (147)
≥ 2∆
δ
+
4
δ
. (148)
According to Theorem 24, the k-deep prefix is permanent under event Gδ[s+∆, t−∆], whose probability
is lower bounded by
P (Gδ[s+ ∆, t−∆]) > 1− 9η−2e−η(t−s−2∆) (149)
≥ 1− 9η−2e−η(1−δ)(t−s) (150)
= 1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α . (151)
In this section, we have defined typical events, studied the properties of various blocks under these
events, and bound the probability of them. The blockchain growth theorem, the blockchain quality
theorems, and the common prefix theorem of bitcoin blockchains are proved for the bitcoin backbone
protocol, which guarantee the liveliness and consistency of bitcoin blockchains. In essence, bitcoin
transactions deep enough in any honest blockchain are with high probability guaranteed to remain in
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the final ledger. This framework can naturally extend to Prism protocol which is based on Nakamoto
consensus.
III. THE PRISM BACKBONE PROTOCOL
The Prism protocol is invented and fully described in [7]. Here we describe the Prism backbone with
just enough details to facilitate its analysis. We assume m+ 1 genesis blocks are generated for the same
number of blockchains at time 0 by honest miners. Blockchain 0 is referred to as the proposer blockchain.
The remaining blockchains are voter blockchains. A block is mined before knowing which blockchain
it will be part of. Sortition relies on the range the nonce’s hash lands in: If a miner find a nonce whose
hash is within [jγ, jγ + γ) for j = 0, 1, . . . ,m, the mined block belongs to blockchain i.
To certify its level, a new honest voter block for blockchain j points to blockchain j’s maximum-level
block by a parent link. In addition, an honest new proposer block includes one reference link to every
existing block in both proposer and voter blockchains that has not been pointed to by other reference
links.
Following the bitcoin protocol, an honest miner decides each main voter blockchain by the longest-
chain rule. The miner determines the its main blockchain by votes from the main voter blockchains. By
saying block B votes for a level l, we mean B chooses one proposer block among all proposer blocks
at level l according to a predefined rule, and points to its choice with a reference link. An honest voter
block votes for all levels which have not been voted by its ancestors. A voter blockchain is allowed to
vote only once for each level (more votes from the same voter blockchain are discarded). At each level,
the proposer block with most votes is elected as a leader block, with ties broken by a predefined rule.
The sequence of leader blocks over all levels is called the leader sequence.
A miner generates its final ledger based on its leader sequence. Given a leader sequence B0B1 . . . Bl,
each leader block Bi defines an epoch. Added to the ledger are the blocks which are pointed to by Bi, as
well as other blocks reachable from Bi but have not been included in previous epochs. The list of blocks
are sorted topologically. Since the blocks referenced are mined independently, there can be double spends
or redundant transactions. An end user can create a valid ledger by keeping only the first transaction
among double spends or redundant transactions.
To analyze the Prism protocol, we first define laggers, loners, and typical events for the proposer
blockchain or each voter blockchain. For each blockchain j(j = 0, 1, . . . ,m), let homogeneous Poisson
point process (Ht,j , t ≥ 0) denote the total number of honest blocks mined up until time t. Also, there
exists an homogeneous Poisson point process (Zt,j , t ≥ 0) that dominates the generation of adversarial
blocks. The mining difficulty can be adjusted so that Ht,j has parameter α and Zt,j has parameter β for
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each j. Similar to that in the bitcoin protocol, an honest block mined at time t in blockchain j is called
a lagger if it is mined strictly more than ∆ seconds after the last honest block on blockchain j is mined.
The lagger is also called a loner if the next block mined is also a lagger.
Let Nj [s, t] = Ht,j − Hs,j , Xj [s, t], and Yj [s, t] denote the number of honest blocks, laggers, and
loners on blockchain j mined during time interval (s, t], respectively. Let Zj [s, t] = Zt,j − Zs,j upper
bound the number of adversarial blocks on blockchain j mined during (s, t]. As in the bitcoin protocol,
we assume
(1− 3δ)g2α > β. (152)
Definition 26. For all non-negative real numbers 0 ≤ s < t, 0 < δ < 1, and integer 0 ≤ j ≤ m, define
Eδj [s, t] = E
δ
1,j [s, t] ∩ Eδ2,j [s, t] ∩ Eδ3,j [s, t] ∩ Eδ4,j [s, t] (153)
where
Eδ1,j [s, t] = {(1− δ)E[Nj [s, t]] < Nj [s, t] < (1 + δ)E[Nj [s, t]]} (154)
Eδ2,j [s, t] = {(1− δ)E[Xj [s, t]] < Xj [s, t]} (155)
Eδ3,j [s, t] = {(1− δ)E[Yj [s, t]] < Yj [s, t]} (156)
Eδ4,j [s, t] = {Zj [s, t] < E[Zj [s, t]] + δE[Yj [s, t]]} . (157)
Lemma 27. For all 0 < δ < 1 and 0 ≤ s < t, we have
P
(
Eδj [s, t]
)
> 1− 7e− 18g2α(t−s). (158)
Definition 28. (Typical event for blockchain j) The δ-typical event on time interval (s, t] is defined as:
Gj [s, t] = ∩a,b∈R,0≤a≤s,0≤bEδj [s− a, t+ b] (159)
Lemma 29. For all real numbers 0 ≤ s < t− 4δ and integer 0 ≤ j ≤ m,
P (Gj [s, t]) > 1− 9η−2e−η(t−s). (160)
Since the proposer blockchain and all voter blockchains grow in the same manner as how a bitcoin
blockchain grows, the blockchain growth lemma and blockchain growth theorem remain valid. Meanwhile,
the blockchain quality theorem and the common prefix theorem only extend to all voter blockchains, since
the leader sequence is decided by voting instead of the longest-chain rule.
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Lemma 30. For all real numbers δ, s, t, and integer k, j satisfying 0 ≤ s < t, 0 < δ < 1, k ≥
(2− δ)α(t− s), and 0 ≤ j ≤ m, under event Gj [s, t], every honest miner’s k-deep block at time t must
be mined no later than s.
Proof. For j = 0, . . . ,m, the lemma admits essentially the same proof at that for Lemma 19.
Theorem 31. (Blockchain growth theorem for proposer and voter blockchains) Let 0 ≤ r < s < t− 2∆δ .
Then under δ-typical event Gδ[s+ ∆, t−∆], the height of every honest blockchain increases by at least
(1− δ)2gα(t− r) during (r, t].
Proof. For j = 0, . . . ,m, the theorem admits essentially the same proof at that for Theorem 20.
Theorem 32. (Blockchain quality theorem for voter blockchains) For integer k ≥ 2(2−δ)α(∆+2)δ and
0 ≤ j ≤ m, in any k consecutive blocks of blockchain j, the fraction of honest blocks is at least
1− (1− δ2)g with probability at least 1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α .
Proof. For j = 1, . . . ,m, the theorem admits essentially the same proof at that for Theorem 21.
Theorem 33. (Common prefix theorem for the voter blockchains) Suppose real numbers s, t, δ and integer
k, j satisfy 0 ≤ s < t − 2∆δ , 0 < δ < 1, k ≥ (2 − δ)α(t − s) and 0 ≤ j ≤ m. Suppose an honest
blockchain j has a k-deep prefix at time t, then under Gδ[s+ ∆, t−∆], the prefix is permanent after t.
Proof. For j = 1, . . . ,m, the theorem admits essentially the same proof at that for Theorem 24.
Definition 34. We let LedSeql(t) denote the proposer blockchain’s leader sequence up to level l at time
t.
Theorem 35. Fix  ∈ (0, 1). Let Tl be the time when the first proposer block on level l is mined. For
real number
t >
3(2− δ)
η(1− δ)3g log
(
18m
η2
)
(161)
LedSeql(Tl + t) is permanent after time Tl + t.
Proof. Denote
k =
⌈
(2− δ)α
η(1− δ) log
(
18
η2
)⌉
. (162)
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Consider voter blockchain 1. According to Theorem 20, under event Gδ1[Tl + ∆, Tl + t − ∆], voter
blockchain 1 grows by at least
(1− δ)2gαt = 3(2− δ)α
η(1− δ) log
(
18m
η2
)
(163)
> 2k (164)
where (164) is due to (2−δ)αη(1−δ) log
(
18
η2
)
≥ 2. Note that the probability of Gδ1[Tl + ∆, Tl + t − ∆] is at
least
1− 9η−2e−η(t−2∆) > 1− 
3m
(165)
where (165) is due to (161). Also, according to Corollary 25, voter blockchain 1’s k-prefix is permanent
with probability at least
1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α > 1− 
3m
(166)
where (166) is due to (161). What is more, according to Theorem 21, the last k blocks of voter blockchain
1’s k-prefix contain at least 1− (1− δ2)g fraction of honest blocks with probability at least
1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α > 1− 
3m
(167)
where (167) is also due to (161). That is to say, there is at least one honest block in the last k blocks of
voter blockchain 1’s k-prefix.
Combine (165), (166) and (167), with probability at least 1 − m , voter blockchain 1 has at least
one honest block which is permanent after time Tl + t, and this honest block is mined after Tl. This
block must have voted for all levels up to level l of the proposer blockchain by the voting rule. By the
union rule, with probability at least 1 − , all voter blockchains have their own honest block which is
permanent after time Tl + t. These honest blocks have finalized their voting to level l. Thus, LedSeql(t)
is -permanent.
Theorem 35 is an analogy to the common prefix theorem for the leader sequence. It guarantees the
consistency of the proposer blockchain. In addition, we can guarantee the quality of the leader sequence
by the following theorem:
Theorem 36. (Blockchain quality theorem for proposer blockchain) For integer k ≥ 2(2−δ)α(∆+2)δ , any
k consecutive leader blocks of the proposer blockchain contain at least 1− (1− δ2)g fraction of honest
blocks with probability at least 1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α .
Proof. Assume the head and tail of these k blocks are at level h0 and h1, respectively. Let h′0 be the
highest level strictly before h0 on which the first proposer block is honest. h′0 can be as high as h0 − 1
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and as low as 0, which corresponds to the genesis block. Assume the first proposer block on level h′0 is
mined right before t0. If this block is the genesis block, then t0 = 0. Let h′1 be the lowest level after h1
on which the first proposer block is honest. Assume the first proposer block on level h′1 is mined right
after t1. If such an h′1 does not exist, let t1 be the current time and let be h′1 be current level plus 1.
From definition, the first proposer block on every level within {h′0 + 1, . . . , h0} and {h1, . . . , h′1 − 1}
is adversarial. From level h′0 to level h′1 − 1, there must be at least one adversarial block on every level
except (possibly) on the levels between h0 and h1 where the leading block is honest.
Assume event Gδ0[t0 +∆, t1−∆] occurs. According to Lemma 19, the number of blocks mined during
(t0, t1] is at most (2− δ)α(t1 − t0). We have
(2− δ)α(t1 − t0) > k (168)
t1 − t0 > k
(2− δ)α (169)
t1 − t0 > 2∆
δ
. (170)
Let z be the number of adversarial blocks within {h0, . . . , h1}. We have
z
k
≤ z + (h0 − h
′
0 − 1) + (h′1 − h1 − 1)
k + (h0 − h′0 − 1) + (h′1 − h1 − 1)
(171)
≤ Z[t0, t1]
X[t0 + ∆, t1 −∆] (172)
<
β(t1 − t0) + δgα(t1 − t0)
(1− δ)gα(t1 − t0 − 2∆) (173)
=
t1 − t0
t1 − t0 − 2∆
1
1− δ
(
β
gα
+ δg
)
(174)
<
1
(1− δ)2
(
β
gα
+ δg
)
(175)
<
1
(1− δ)2 ((1− 3δ)g + δg) (176)
< (1− δ2)g, (177)
where (171) is due to z ≤ k, (172) is because at least one block on level {h′0+1, . . . , h0} and {h1, . . . , h′1−
1} is adversarial, (173) is due to Theorem 20 and (5), (176) is due to (23), and (177) is due to δ ∈ (0, 1).
Also note that
P (Gδ0[t0 + ∆, t1 −∆]) > 1− 9η−2e−η(t1−t0−2∆) (178)
≥ 1− 9η−2e−η(1−δ)(t1−t0) (179)
> 1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α (180)
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To sum up, with probability at least 1 − 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α , event Gδ0[t0 + ∆, t1 −∆] occurs, under which
the fraction of honest blocks is ensured.
Definition 37. A transaction is honest if it has been broadcast, and no other transaction spending from
the same unspent output has been broadcast.
Definition 38. A transaction is said to be -permanent after round r if, with probability at least 1 − ,
it remains on the final ledger of every honest miner after round r.
Lemma 39. Suppose right before time s, the leader block on level l is honest. Suppose this leader block
is mined at time t. If an honest transaction enters a block and the block is broadcast before time t, then
every honest miner’s final ledger generated by LedSeql(r) will include this honest transaction.
Proof. Suppose the honest transaction tx enters block B which is broadcast by time s. Note that B may
be honest or adversarial, a voter block or a leader block, and it can be on the main blockchain or an
orphan block. Denote the honest leader block on level l as Bl.
By saying block B is reachable from block A, we mean A can points to B by a sequence of reference
links. According to the Prism protocol, all blocks which are reachable from an honest leader block will
be included in the final ledger. By round R, one of the following three cases must be true:
1) B is not reachable by any blocks. According to the Prism protocol, Bl will reference B, so B will
be included in the final ledger.
2) B is reachable from an honest leader block whose level is smaller than l, then B must already be
included in the final ledger.
3) B is reachable from some block(s), but none of these block(s) is an honest leader block whose
level is smaller than l. Note that the number of proposer blocks by round R is finite, and that reference
links cannot form a circle. Thus, among all the proposer blocks which can reach B, there must be at
least one proposer block which is not referenced by any other block by round R. Denote such a block
as Br. Then according to the Prism protocol, Bl will reference Br. As a sequence, B will be included
in the final ledger.
Once B is included in the ledger, the honest transaction tx will not be discarded.
Theorem 40. For every  > 0 and every real number
t >
5(2− δ)
η(1− δ)3g log
(
54m
η2
)
(181)
assume an honest transaction enters into a block and the block is broadcast at time s. Then, the transaction
is -permanent after time s+ t.
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Proof. Denote
t0 =
2(2− δ)
η(1− δ)3g log
(
54m
η2
)
(182)
and
k =
⌈
(2− δ)α
η(1− δ) log
(
54m
η2
)⌉
. (183)
Denote the highest level of proposer blockchain right before time s is h. Denote the highest level of
proposer blockchain right before time s + t0 is h0. Then, the first proposer block on level h0 is mined
before s + t0. According to Theorem 35, since t − t0 ≥ 3(2−δ)η(1−δ)3g log
(
54m
η2
)
, the leader sequence up to
level h0 is 3 -permanent after time s+ t.
According to Theorem 20, under event Gδ0[s+ ∆, s+ t0 −∆], proposer blockchain grows by at least
(1− δ)2gαt0 = 2(2− δ)α
η(1− δ) log
(
54m
η2
)
(184)
> k. (185)
Note that the probability of Gδ0[s+ ∆, s+ t0 −∆] is at least
1− 9η−2e−η(t0−2∆) > 1− 9η−2e−η(1−δ)t0 > 1− 
3
(186)
where (186) is due to (182). Also, according to Theorem 21, the blocks at the increased height (at least
k) of the proposer proposer blockchain contain at least 1 − (1 − δ2)g fraction of honest blocks with
probability at least
1− 9η−2e− η(1−δ)k(2−δ)α > 1− 
3
(187)
where (187) is due to (183). That is to say, there is at least one honest leader block within levels
{h, . . . , h0}.
To sum up, combine (186) and (187), with probability at least 1−, after time s+t, the leader sequence
up to level h0 is permanent, and this leader sequence contains at least one honest block. According to
Lemma 39, this honest leader block will include the honest transaction to the final ledger.
Theorem 40 illustrates that every honest transaction that is sufficiently deep in an honest blockchain
will eventually become permanent. Moreover, the confirmation time is proportional to log 1 when we
want to ensure at most  probability of failure. Liveliness and consistency of the Prism transactions are
justified.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the bitcoin and the Prism backbone protocols using more general
models than in previous analyses. In particular, we assume a continuous-time model with no lifespan
limitations and allow the block propagation delays to be arbitrary but bounded. Under the new setting, we
have rigorously established a blockchain growth theorem, a blockchain quality theorem, and a common
prefix theorem for the bitcoin backbone protocol. We have also proved a blockchain growth theorem
and a blockchain quality theorem of the leader sequence in the Prism protocol. We have also shown
that the leader sequence is permanent with high probability after sufficient amount of wait time. As a
consequence, every valid transaction will eventually enter the final ledger and become permanent with
probability higher than 1− after a confirmation time proportional to security parameter log 1 . This paper
provides explicit security bounds for the bitcoin and the Prism backbone transactions, which improves
understanding of both protocols and provides practical guidance to public transaction ledger protocol
design.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system,” Available online: http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, 2008.
[2] J. Garay, A. Kiayias, and N. Leonardos, “The bitcoin backbone protocol: Analysis and applications,” in Annual International
Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 281–310, Springer, 2015.
[3] A. Kiayias and G. Panagiotakos, “Speed-security tradeoffs in blockchain protocols.,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
vol. 2015, p. 1019, 2015.
[4] R. Pass, L. Seeman, and A. Shelat, “Analysis of the blockchain protocol in asynchronous networks,” in Annual International
Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, pp. 643–673, Springer, 2017.
[5] L. Kiffer, R. Rajaraman, and S. Abhi, “A better method to analyze blockchain consistency,” in Proceedings of the 2018
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 729–744, ACM, 2018.
[6] J. Garay, A. Kiayias, and N. Leonardos, “The bitcoin backbone protocol with chains of variable difficulty,” in Annual
International Cryptology Conference, pp. 291–323, Springer, 2017.
[7] V. Bagaria, S. Kannan, D. Tse, G. Fanti, and P. Viswanath, “Deconstructing the blockchain to approach physical limits,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.08092, 2018.
[8] J. Li and D. Guo, “On analysis of the bitcoin and prism backbone protocols,” arXiv:1907.05016v1, 2019.
[9] L. Ren, “Analysis of nakamoto consensus,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2019, p. 943, 2019.
[10] C. Decker and R. Wattenhofer, “Information propagation in the bitcoin network,” in IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings, pp. 1–10,
IEEE, 2013.
[11] Y. Sompolinsky and A. Zohar, “Secure high-rate transaction processing in bitcoin,” in International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, pp. 507–527, Springer, 2015.
[12] Y. Lewenberg, Y. Sompolinsky, and A. Zohar, “Inclusive block chain protocols,” in International Conference on Financial
Cryptography and Data Security, pp. 528–547, Springer, 2015.
[13] Y. Sompolinsky, Y. Lewenberg, and A. Zohar, “Spectre: A fast and scalable cryptocurrency protocol.,” IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, vol. 2016, p. 1159, 2016.
28
[14] Y. Sompolinsky and A. Zohar, “Phantom,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/104, 2018.
[15] C. Natoli and V. Gramoli, “The balance attack against proof-of-work blockchains: The r3 testbed as an example,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1612.09426, 2016.
[16] C. Li, P. Li, W. Xu, F. Long, and A. C.-c. Yao, “Scaling nakamoto consensus to thousands of transactions per second,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.03870, 2018.
[17] Z. Zheng, S. Xie, H.-N. Dai, X. Chen, and H. Wang, “Blockchain challenges and opportunities: A survey,” International
Journal of Web and Grid Services, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 352–375, 2018.
[18] I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, and R. Van Renesse, “Bitcoin-ng: A scalable blockchain protocol,” in 13th {USENIX}
Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation ({NSDI} 16), pp. 45–59, 2016.
[19] R. Pass and E. Shi, “Fruitchains: A fair blockchain,” in Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed
Computing, pp. 315–324, ACM, 2017.
[20] S. M. Ross, S. M. Ross, S. M. Ross, S. M. Ross, and E.-U. Mathématicien, A first course in probability. Prentice Hall
Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1998.
[21] M. Mitzenmacher and E. Upfal, Probability and computing: Randomization and probabilistic techniques in algorithms and
data analysis. Cambridge university press, 2017.
